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Abstract
We incorporate endogenous (price-responsive) consumption pollution into a dual trade model to assess welfare effects
of coordinated trade and environmental piecemeal reform in a small, open and distorted economy. Pollution is
generated by production and consumption. Producers control the level of pollution and face incentives to abate both
types of pollution. We identify sufficient conditions for welfare-improving reforms of trade and environmental policies.
An additional domestic environmental policy instrument must be imposed on exportables because of their supply
response to foreign environmental taxes.

This paper is a shortened and updated version of Metcalfe and Beghin. It focuses on environmental taxes. Metcalfe and Beghin include the case
of environmental quotas. The manuscript has benefited from comments from an anonymous referee and Associate Editor Rick Bond, and from
presentations at the IATRC meetings, The AAEA meetings, North Carolina State University and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, and from discussions with David Orden, David Roland-Holst and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe. The usual disclaimer applies.
Citation: Mark R Metcalfe and John C Beghin, (2015) ''Piecemeal Reform of Trade and Environmental Policy When Consumption Also
Pollutes'', Economics Bulletin, Volume 35, Issue 4, pages 2282-2287
Contact: Mark R Metcalfe - metcalfe@fs.fed.us, John C Beghin - beghin@iastate.edu.
Submitted: July 28, 2014. Published: November 20, 2015.

1. Introduction
Most of the analytical literature addressing the coordination of trade and environmental policy
reform has focused on production externalities and has not thoroughly investigated the
implications of pollution emitted in consumption and the incentives faced by producers to alter
the pollution content of their goods released during consumption with the exception of Wang et
al., and Ishikawa and Okubo who address the issue in imperfect competitive setting.
We investigate trade and environmental policy reform and coordination in the presence of
consumption-induced pollution in a perfectly competitive economy. We focus on domestic
externalities where pollution emitted in production and consumption, is a bad for the domestic
representative consumer. Producers control the level of pollution emitted during the consumption
of their good by altering the input mix in production. An asymmetry arises between exportables
and importables as production decisions for exportables are responsive to the foreign taxes on
consumption-pollution, unlike the case of importables. The foreign tax is exogenous to the
domestic policymaker, and therefore, it is important to distinguish exportables from importables.
We examine policy reform for an economy beset by both tariffs and pollution. A second
scenario considers the effects of tariffs and pollution quotas/permits and is reported in a
companion paper. In both cases, producers control the level of pollution released through the
consumption of their goods, and they face incentives to abate this pollution. We derive sufficient
conditions for welfare improvements for coordinated reforms of trade and environmental
policies. We identify negative incentive effects that may arise for pollution linked to domestic
consumption of exportables. This pollution primarily responds to foreign pollution policies.
Trade liberalization may increase the production of exportables that are pollution-intensive in
consumption -the pollution content of these goods increases with higher output prices. If the rest
of the world does not tighten its policies to discourage its demand for these high-pollution
exportables, then it is possible that domestic consumption of these high pollution exportables
may release more pollution at home and therefore lead to a decrease in welfare.
The lack of control over foreign policy on pollution calls for an additional domestic
policy instrument by the domestic policy maker to control pollution emitted by the consumption
of exportables. This finding on the need for either an additional instrument constitutes an
important refinement of established recommendations for trade and environment policy
coordination. Copeland (1994) and Beghin et al. (1997) show that in general, two domestic
instruments, trade and environmental taxes, used jointly, can improve welfare, because they
insure that trade does not induce environmental degradation and that environmental taxes do
exacerbate the distorting effect of tariffs (See also Turunen-Red and Woodland for similar
recommendations in a multilateral context). Metcalfe and Beghin provide a longer treatment of
the points made in this manuscript.
2. Tariffs and Pollution Taxes
We distinguish between pollution tax rates in production and consumption. This is equivalent to
having two different types of pollution: one type incurred through production and one type
through consumption. This separation allows us to investigate the effects of consumption-linked
policies. We assume that producers have the ability to alter the intensity of the pollution
occurring with the consumption of their output. We assume that consumers are pollution
damage-takers with respect to their consumption decisions. Consumers do perceive aggregate
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pollution and its negative utility effect, but they do not perceive the impact, through aggregation,
of their individual atomistic decisions.
What are the incentives for producers to alter these effluent intensities? They do so to
exhaust arbitrage opportunities arising from the lower pollution intensities of domestic goods as
opposed to their foreign substitutes. If they adopt a production technology that generates less
pollution during consumption than that of their foreign competitors, and if this pollution is taxed
both domestically and abroad, then producers can increase their output price up to the point
where their price, inclusive of the tax on consumption-induced pollution, is equal to the
corresponding price and tax of the foreign competing good.
We denote the per-unit intensity of pollution released in the consumption of goods by α
(a vector of intensities for n goods), and the tax on a unit of consumption emissions by sc.
Parameters and variables for the rest-of-the-world are designated by an asterisk. For convenience
and without loss of generality, we assume throughout that α* > α and sc ≥ sc*. This assumption
indicates a technological advantage, possibly driven by regulation, of the domestic country, such
as in the case of an OECD-member country, relative to the rest of the world.
Domestic producers as a whole set the prices for their goods in order to capture the
potential consumer benefits that would be received through the lower pollution intensity of
domestically produced goods. Foreign consumers pay a tax of sc*α* in addition to the world
price for a foreign-produced exportable good, but will only have to pay sc*α for the exported
domestic good. Therefore through arbitrage, all consumers, foreign and domestic, pay an
additional sc*(α*-α) per unit of domestic exportables. The pre-tax consumption price at which
producers of exportables are able to sell their products is: Ppe=Qe+τe +sc*' (αe*-αe), where Pp is
the vector of prices received by the producer, Q is the vector of exogenously determined world
prices, τ is the per-unit vector of domestic export taxes/subsidies (τe>0 represents an export
subsidy), and superscript e designates exportable goods.
Similar intuition applied to the import market and domestic consumers provides the
producer price of imports: Ppm=Qm+τm+sc’(αm*-αm), where τm is the per unit vector of domestic
import taxes/subsidies (τm > 0 is an import tax) and superscript m represents importable goods.
The total price paid by consumers for a good is equal to the producer price plus the
amount of tax paid on consumption pollution. Therefore, the domestic consumer price for
exportables is: Pce=Qe+τe+sc*'(αe*-αe)+sc'αe, where Pc is the vector of consumer prices. A
domestically produced importable will have its consumer price equal to its domestic producer
price, Qm+τm+sc'(αm*-αm), plus a tax of sc'αm. A foreign-produced importable will have a
domestic consumer price equal to the foreign producer price after the border of Qm+τm plus a tax
of sc'αm*. Consumers must be indifferent between the two goods in equilibrium, hence Pcm=Qm+
τm+sc'αm*.
We use a dual treatment of a perfectly competitive and open economy (Copeland, 1994).
We consider the case of n goods, each containing one production pollutant and one consumption
pollutant, which are taxed. A revenue function summarizes production decisions in competitive
markets and is characterized as: R(Ppm(τm, sc), Ppe(τe, sc*),sc, sc*, sγ,v) = max(x,A,Γ){[(Qm+τm
+sc'αm*)'xm-sc'Am-sγ’Γm] + [(Qe+τe +sc*'αe*)'xe -sc*'Ae-sγ'Γe] | (x, A, and Γ) feasible given inputs
v}, where x is the vector of production; A is total pollution generated through consumption of
domestically produced products, A = α'x; γ is the vector of per-unit production pollution
intensity for n goods, sγ is the per-unit production pollution tax, Γ is total pollution generated
through production of domestically produced products, Γ=γ'x. The revenue function incorporates
2

both a direct and an indirect feedback effect on the revenues of importables caused by an
exogenous change in the tax level sc. These two effects reflect producers' adjustment of the levels
of the consumption effluent rate with a change in sc, as a high α adversely affects their abilities
to set higher prices through arbitrage. The direct effect is the change in R given constant prices
and output, while the indirect feedback involves an output effect occurring from the change in
producer price.
The revenue function satisfies all the usual properties. Applying the envelope theorem to
R, the following results are obtained: R p =xm; R p =xe; Rpp is the Hessian of price elasticities for
m

ex

output x; R s =-Γ; R s =xm'αm*-Am|p, which is the consumption pollution savings on all
importables produced domestically as compared to if they had all been imported; Rs s is the
γ

c

c c

response of this savings to a change in consumption pollution tax and it is positive semi-definite;
R s p is minus the cross-price response of this difference to a change in output prices and is
c

positive semi-definite; and R ps is the response of output to a change in the consumption
pollution tax. The usual symmetry holds, R ps ’= Rs p .
=
The
expenditure
function
is:
E(Pcm(τm,sc),Pce(τe,sc,sc*),T,Uo)
min(c){(Qm+τm+sc'αm*)'cm+(Qe+τe+sc*'(αe*-αe)+sc'αe)'ce| U≥Uo}, where c is the vector of
consumption, and U≥U0 is the utility constraint. Envelope theorem results provide E p =cm,
c

c

c

m

e

m

m

e

e

E p ex =c , and E sc =c 'α *+c 'α . The latter is the consumption pollution if all importables

consumed were imported plus the pollution emitted by the consumption of exportables; E s s is
the scalar response of this pollution to a change in consumption pollution tax and is negative;
E s p is the cross-price response of this total pollution to a change in consumer prices; Epp is the
Hessian of price responses of consumption; E ps is the cross-price response of consumption to a
c c

c

c

change in the consumption pollution tax; and again by symmetry, E ps ’= E s p . EU is the inverse
of the marginal utility of income.
The pollution generated in domestic consumption Tcons is Tcons = E s - R s . Total pollution
c

c

c

c

T is constructed as a measure of total domestic pollution in the economy emitted through both
consumption and production; T ≡ Tcons+ Tprod; where Tprod is production pollution and is equal to
- R s . Therefore, T= E s - R s - R s , or T= cm'αm*+ce'αe - xm’(αm*-αm) +Γ. This definition could
γ

c

c

γ

accommodate asymmetric marginal impacts on utility for the two types of pollution by weighting
Tcons and Tprod differently. As mentioned above, atomistic consumers are marginal damage-takers
and this is represented by restricting the change in expenditure with respect to total pollution, ET,
to be a constant to the individual agent. This assumption allows us to treat otherwise
homogenous domestic and foreign goods with different α and α*, as perfect substitutes. That is,
the individual consumer does not value the difference in pollution intensities, except for their tax
incidence on her/his expenditure.
The equilibrium of the economy is represented by the following equations which equate
expenditures and revenues and define total pollution and net-imports:
(1) E=R+τ‘M+sc'Tcons-sγ'Tprod ,
(2) T≡Tcons+Tprod , and (3) M=Ep-Rp.
Totally differentiating equation (1) provides the following fundamental relationships
between welfare, trade, and pollution:
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(4) EUdU=τ’dM+(sc-ET)’dTcons+(sγ-ET)’dTprod.-Epe (sc-sc*)dαe .
Distortions in the economy are imposed through the implementation of tariffs and non-optimal
effluent taxes, as well as by the difference between the domestic and foreign effluent taxes on
consumption. The distortions caused through non-optimal taxes are separated into consumption
and production pollution effects on welfare. equation (4) shows the negative welfare effect of
increases in exportable consumption pollution intensity. Increases in αe cause an unambiguous
welfare loss.
The overall effect of pollution in the model is determined through differentiation of (2):
(5) dT=(dT/dsc|α)dsc+(dT/dsγ)dsγ+(dT/dP)dτ+EscU dU+ EscT dT+Escpe (sc-sc*)dαe.
Abatement in total pollution is a function of six components: effluent taxes in consumption and
production, tariffs, welfare, changes in the marginal damage of pollution, and the pollution
intensity of exportables in consumption. Therefore, pollution is dependent on exogenous policy
changes as well as on a real income effect, a feedback effect of the marginal damage of
pollution, and the pollution intensities of exportables. The cross-price effect of αe on total
pollution reflects its dependence on foreign environmental policies (sc*), tariff reform, and the
available arbitrage opportunities of producers reacting to this foreign tax.
In a similar fashion, the effects on net imports are found through differentiation of (3):
(6) dM=(dM/dsc)dsc- R ps dsγ+(dM/dP)dτ+EpU dU+EpT dT+Epp(sc-sc*) dαe.
γ

In the same way, net imports are dependent on exogenous policy changes, a real income effect,
changes in the marginal damage of pollution, and the effect of αe on the consumer price of
exportables again through producer arbitrage.
Changes in the policy instruments τ, sc, and sγ and their effect on the consumption
pollution intensities of exportables are best understood by remembering that αi=Ai /xi, which
reflects decisions by producers as summarized by the revenue function. The changes are
represented by:
(7) dαe=(dαe/dP)dτ+(dαe/dsγ)dsγ+[dαe/dsc|p+(dαe/dP)(dP/dsc)]dsc.
The endogenous response of αe to changes in sc contains both the direct and indirect effects from
the revenue function.
3. Coordinated Policy Reforms with Pollution Taxes
Substituting equations (5) and (6) into equation (4) provides the comparative-statics of joint trade
and environmental piecemeal reform in terms of the policy instruments and the feedback effect
on αe. We obtain:
(8) DdU = {τ‘dM/dP + (sc-ETge) dTcons/dP + (sγ-ETge) dTprod/dP}dτ
+ {τ‘ dM/dsc + (sc-ETge) dTcons/dsc|α + (sγ- ETge) dTprod/dsc|α}dsc
+ {τ‘dM/dsγ + (sc-ETge) dTcons/dsγ|α + (sγ-ETge) dTprod/dsγ|α}dsγ - {C}dαe ,
with D=EU-τ‘EpU-sc EscU +ETge EscU >0 denoting the general equilibrium inverse of marginal
utility of income, C = B +ETge E s p (sc-sc*) >0 denoting the general equilibrium consumption E p
e

e

c

ge

times (sc-sc*), B=( E p -τ‘ E pp -sc E s p )(sc-sc*) >0, and with ET =(ET-τ‘EpT-sc E s T )(1- E s T )
e

e

e

c

c

-1

c

denoting the general equilibrium marginal damage of pollution. We did not substitute in the
endogenous change dαe from equation (7) because the current form of (8) decomposes the
welfare effects of the coordinated reform into a positive effect holding αe constant and an
ambiguous component due to the feedback on dαe.
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Establishing unambiguous results for coordinated trade liberalization and environmental
policy reforms in the presence of dαe requires either an additional policy instrument or more
structure to identify special cases. We do this in sequence next.
We consider the following joint reform: trade liberalization achieved by a proportional
decrease of tariff distortions (dτ=-kτ) accompanied by a proportional decrease of pollution
distortions dsc=-k(sc-ETge) and dsγ=-k(sγ-ETge), and with the imposition of a process standard or a
cap on αe set at the just binding pre-reform level and which insures that αe does not increase with
the reform of tariffs and pollution taxes. These joint reforms correspond to the coordinated
policies examined in Copeland (1994) and Beghin et al. (1997). The tariff and tax instruments
alone unambiguously increase welfare, except for their potentially "perverse" feedback effect on
αe that could increase pollution and therefore decrease welfare. The process standard fixing
pollution emitted in consumption on exportables (α0), then caps the potential feedback effect of
tariff and tax changes on these pollution intensities; it insures that the coordinated reform is
welfare-improving (i.e., a sufficient condition is dαe ≤ 0). The foreign effluent tax, sc*, has a
strong negative influence on αe, but it is exogenous to the domestic policymaker. We summarize
this discussion formally:
Result 1. Under the assumptions of section 2, a coordinated proportional policy reform: dτ=kτ, dsc=-k(sc-ETge), dsγ=-k(sγ-ETge), accompanied by a just-binding standard on exportable
pollution intensity: αe≤α0, is welfare improving.
The standard, which may be non-optimal (marginal damage of pollution and shadow
price of the standard may not be equal), improves welfare when it is set at a just binding level.
The use of a standard in our analysis is reminiscent of the use of a standard in the case of
transboundary pollution analyzed by Copeland (1993). Our case differs because we analyze a
domestic externality problem and tariffs are reduced towards their first best levels.
The third instrument imposed on αe is not necessary in an important special case. If sc*
and sc are equal before the reform or do not exist, then the coordinated reform of tariffs and taxes
has no feedback on intensities αe and is welfare improving. We summarize this case in the
following result.
Result 2. Under the assumptions of model section 2, if pollution is not regulated before the
policy reform (sc*=sc=0) or trading partners have harmonized environmental taxes (sc*=sc),
then a coordinated proportional reform: dτ=-kτ, dsc=-k(sc-ETge), dsγ=-k(sγ-ETge), is welfare
improving.
4. Concluding Remarks
We derived sufficient conditions for welfare-improving piecemeal trade and environmental
policy reforms in the presence of both production and consumption pollution, and when
producers respond to domestic and foreign effluent taxes on consumption-induced pollution. An
additional policy instrument is required to cap pollution intensities of exportables, such as a
standard capping the intensity of consumption pollution.
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